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CORPORATE TAXATION: CORPORATION NOT
COLLAPSIBLE IF VIEW TO SELL ARISES
AFTER COMPLETION OF CONSTRUCTION
SEC'rION 341 of the Internal Revenue Code1 provides that gain from
the sale or exchange of stock in a "collapsible corporation" is to be taxed
as ordinary income rather than as capital gain.2 The statute defines a
collapsible corporation as "a corporation formed or availed of prin-
cipally3 for the manufacture, construction, or production of property
- . . with a view to the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders
(whether in liquidation or otherwise), or a distribution to its share-
'The "collapsible corporation" provision was enacted in 195o: Int. Rev. Code of
1939, § 117(m) added by ch. 994, 64 Stat. 9o6 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341).
'The tax advantages originally enjoyed by the use of the "collapsible corporation"
and the congressional purpose in enacting corrective legislation are set out in the
following Senate report:
"'The collapsible corporation is a device which has been used in an attempt to convert
,ordinary income into long-term capital gain by use of a temporary corporation. The
device has been used principally in the motion picture industry. A legitimate corpo.-
tion engaged in the businesss of producing motion pictures would ordinarily pay the
corporate income tax on its net income and its shareholders would pay ordinary income
tax on their dividends from the corporation. Producers have tried to avoid these
results by organizing separate corporations for each motion picture. Upon completion
of the film but prior to the realization by the corporation of any income therefrom, the
corporation is liquidated and the assets are distributed. In such a case, the corporation
pays no tax, claiming that it has realized no income. The producer pays tax upon the
difference between his cost and the fair market value of the assets so distributed5 but
such gain is reported as long-term capital gain with a maximum effective rate of z-5
percent. After liquidation, the fair market value of the released production is ordinarily
amortized against the income from the film as it is received. If the income from the
film does not exceed such fair market value, there is no further tax.
"In addition to the motion-picture industry, it is understood that the collapsible-
corporation device has also been used in the building-construction trade by contractors
who have corporations construct buildings for sale and then liquidate the corporation
and sell the buildings as individuals.
"Under section 213 of your committee's bill the gain realized from the sale 'or
-exchange (including liquidation) of stock in a collapsible corporation will be treated
as ordinary income for tax purposes . . . ." S. REsP. No. 2375, gist Cong., 2d Sess.
45 (i95o). The identical report is contained in H.R. REP. No. 2319, gist Cong., zd
Sess. 56 (i50o).
' The Courts have held that "principally" modifies "manufacture, construction, or
production of property," rather than "with a view to." Burge v. Commissioner, 2S3
F.zd 765, 768 (4 th Cir. 1958), Weil v. Commissioner, 252 F.zd 8o5, 8o6 (2d Cir.
1958).
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holders, prior to the realization ... of a substantial part of the net in-
come to be derived from such property . . . ." A frequent problem
that arises in determining whether a corporation is "collapsible" is the
interpretation of the phrase "with'a view to."
In the recent case of Jacobson ti.' Commissioner" the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that a corporation formed to construct a
housing project was not collapsible since the petitioners'0 intent to sell
their stock arose only after completion of construction and the circum-
stances that led to the sale of the stock were not within their reasonable
contemplation before construction had been completed. Thus, the gain
realized from the sale of stock was held to be taxable as capital gain
rather than as ordinary income. In so holding, the court adopted a
much more favorable attitude toward the taxpayer than that presently
held by other courts of appeals and the Tax Court.
The petitioners in Jacobson formed Hudson Towers, Inc., for the
construction of five apartment buildings. A short time after completion
of construction, a small crack was discovered in one of the buildings.
Fearful that the buildings might develop additional and more extensive
cracks, petitioners sold their stock in the corporation. The Commis-
sioner, determining that Hudson Towers was a collapsible corporation,
held that the gain from the sale of stock was taxable as ordinary income.
On appeal to the Tax Court, 7 petitioners claimed that the corpora-
tion had been formed for long-term investment purposes and that the
sale of stock resulted solely from an unanticipated defect in one of the
buildings which made the petitioners fearful of the security of their
investment. They argued that the corporation was not collapsible since
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3 41(b)(.). For general treatments of the "col-
.apsible orporation," see: Bittker, The Tax Treatment of Collapsible Corporations,
13 VAND. L. REV. 1z9 (1959); Donaldson, Collapsible Corporations, 36 TAXES 777
(x958)i Seidman, Collapsible Corporations-Appicable to Real Estate Transactions,
15 TAX L. REv. 121 (1959); Collapsible Corporations: A Symposium on What Is
ad What Is Not Collapsible, 12 J. TAXATION 194 (1960); Note, Collapsible Corpora-
tions: An Analysis of the Past, Present, and Proposed Collapsible Concepts, 28 GEO.
WAH. L. REv. 855 (196o).
281 F.zd ,7o3 (3d Cir. 196o). Jacobson involved an interpretation of § 117
(m)(2) (A) of. the 1939 Internal Revenue Code. Because thissection of the 1939
Code is substantially identical to § 3 4 1(b)(i) of the 1954 Code, in discussing Jacobson
reference will be made to § 3 4 s (b)(s).
aIn determining whether the requisite "view" is present, the persons whose "view"
governs are "those persons in a position to determine the policies of the corporation
whether by reason of their owning a majority of the voting stock of the corporation
or otherwise." Treas. Reg. § 1.34"1-2(a)(2) (1955).
732 T.C. 893 (1959).
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it had not been formed with the requisite statutory intent or "view to"
sale, which they contended had to be formed not later than at the time
of completion of construction. In support of their position, the peti-
tioners cited the following Treasury Regulation:'
[I]f the sale, exchange, or distribution is attributable solely to circum-
stances which arose after the manufacture, construction, production, or
purchase (other than circumstances which reasonably could be anticipated
at the time of such manufacture, construction, production or purchase), the
corporation shall, in the absence of compelling facts to the contrary, be con-
sidered not to have been so formed or availed of.
The Tax Court affirmed the Commissioner's decision, finding that
the requisite "view" existed prior to the completion of construction.
Thus, the court held that the corporation was collapsible as defined by
the Regulations. The court further remarked that the Regulations
might be unduly favorable to the petitioner and that, possibly, even
if the "view" arose after completion of construction, the corporation
might still be collapsible.
Other courts also have questioned the position of the Treasury as
to when the requisite "view" must be formed. Dicta in cases from
the Courts of Appeals for the Second"0 and Fourth 1 Circuits suggest
that section 341 (b) (I) should be construed so that the phrase "with a
view to" modifies the phrase "formed or availed of," and not the phrase
"manufacture, construction, or production of property." Under this con-
struction, the requisite view might exist at any time the corporation is
"availed of" for the purpose of enabling the shareholders to realize gain
attributable to the manufacture, construction or production of property
'Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a)(3) (.955). For examples of when the "view" is not
present, see Treas. Reg. § 1.z4x-5(d)(3) (1955) (eorporation-not collapsible when
sale of stock due to sudden and unexpected illness) 5 Rev. Rul. 57-575, 1957-2 CuM.
BULL. 236 (corporation not collapsible when sale of stock due to legislation passed
subsequent to completion of construction).
' The court held that the petitioners' argument that the "view to selP' arose only
after the defect had been discovered was supported only by the self-serving testimony
of the petitioners and was "unconvincing." The court stated: "If the initial intent of
long-term investment was as strong and persistent as petitioners contend, we think
it unlikely and improbable that it gave way to fears arising from what appears to have
been an insubstantial crack in one of the five apartment buildings." The court also
attached significance to the fact thdt the petitioners had not consulted an architect 'or
engineer concerning the possibility of future defects developing in the buildings, but hid
relied almost exclusively on the fears of one of the shareholders.
I5 Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d xo8 (2d Cir. 1958).
"
1 Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.zd 765 (4th Cir. 1958).
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before the corporation itself had realized a substantial part of the net
income to be derived from the property. Therefore, subject only to the
limitations prescribed in the statute, 2 the requisite view might be
formed after the construction had been completed or at any other time
during the corporate existence. 8
Thus, in Jacobson the Court of Appeals was confronted with two
different positions as to when the statutory view must be formed for a
corporation to be collapsible. The court adopted the position of the
Regulations. In rejecting the interpretations expounded by the Second
and Fourth Circuits, the court said:14
On the face of the statute Congress is here indicating a state of mind which
must attend and give significance to certain action. That action ...is not
merely any formation or use of a corporation but rather the formation or use
of a corporation to construct or produce property. The "view" with which a
corporation is used for a particular purpose must necessarily be a view enter-
tained at the time of such use. Thus, only by a distorting disregard of the
phrase "for the ...construction ...of property" is it possible to reach the
conclusion that the "view to . . .sale" contemplated by the statute can arise
for the first time in connection with corporate activity after the work of con-
struction is completed.
It would appear that the interpretation given the phrase "with
a view to" by the court in this case is sounder than that of the Second
and Fourth Circuits. It is true that the latter interpretation would ease
the administration of the statute by alleviating the necessity of finding
the time at which the requisite "view" existed. However, such an
"See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 34 1(d) and § 341(e).
"In Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F.zd xo8, iii (2d Cir. 1959), the court in
criticizing the narrow scope given the statute by the Treasury, said:
"Since the corporation may at any time during its corporate life be 'availed of' for the
proscribed purpose ...it seems surprising that the Regulations have adopted a nar-
rower interpretation of the statute, and require the requisite view to exist 'during the
construction . . .' or to be 'attributable' to 'circumstances which reasonably could be
anticipated by the time of such ...construction.' We are disposed to disagree with so
narrow an interpretation."
The position of Burge, 253 F.zd 765 (4 th Cir. 1958), and Glickman, supra, was
questioned in Payne v. Commissioner, z68 F.zd 617 (5th Cir. 1959), in which the
court said at 6zo:
"While not disagreeing with this construction of the statute, we recognize that it seems
to overlook the requirement by the statute that the corporation must be availed of for
ponstruction of property with a vie'w to a distribution, etc. A respectable argument can
be made that this means that unless the 'view' is held before or during construction, the
statute is not satisfied."
2" 281 F.ad at 705.
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interpretation would virtually abolish the subjective test that Congress
intended to be applied and would render meaningless the phrase "with
a view to."
Applying its interpretation of the statute to the facts in Jacobson,
the court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion
that the "view to sell" did not arise until after completion of construc-
tion and that the circumstances that led to the sale were not within
reasonable contemplation before construction was completed. There-
fore, Hudson Towers, Inc., was not a collapsible corporation. This
finding that the requisite view did not exist prior to the completion of
construction was based primarily upon the following facts: (i) After
construction had been completed, a real estate broker who on two
occasions sought authority to sell the apartment houses was told that
the property was not for sale; (2) the petitioners had made other
long-term investments in rental property; (3) none of the petitioners
was in the business of constructing and selling apartment houses or any
other kind of real estate; (4) since the apartments had been constructed
on ground on which it had been necessary to deposit fill, it was natural
for the petitioners to fear that further and more extensive cracks might
develop; and (5) a majority of the petitioners originally did not wish
to sell even after the cracks had been discovered and after one of the
petitioners had recommended sale.
Prior to Jacobson, taxpayers had met with little success in attempt-
ing to prove that their "view to sell" arose after completion of con-
struction. Courts found either that the "view" arose while construction
was still in progress or that the circumstances causing the sale or distri-
bution were actually anticipated or reasonably could have been antici-
pated.la Since taxpayers often have misused the corporate entity by
5 in attempting to prove that their "view" to sale or distribution arose after comple-
tion of construction, other taxpayers have unsuccessfully argued that: (i) The plan
to distribute excess mortgage funds was formed after the construction was completed,
upon the advice of the petitioners' accountants. Jesse Hartman, P-H Tax Ct. Rep. &
Mem. Dec. 34.111 (Sept. zz, i96o)5 appeal docketed, No. 658z6, zd Cir., Dec. 75,
396o. (2) Due to strike possibilities and uncertain cost, it was impossible until after the
completion of construction to know that mortgage proceeds would exceed the cost
of construction. Rose Sidney, 3o T.C. 1i55 (195S). (3) There was a distribution
of surplus mortgage funds and a redemption of stock one year after completion of
construction when the need for funds or another project became urgent. Elizabeth M.
August, 3o T.C. 969 (1958). (4) There was a sale of stock because of disagree-
ment among shareholders. Max Mintz, 32 T.C. 7z3 (.958). (5) Stock was sold
to avoid undesirable competition, to secure common equipment and janitor service,
and to avoid management problems. Carl B. Rechner, 30 T.C. x86 (1958). (6) The
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forming temporary corporations and then selling or liquidating in order
to take advantage of capital gain rates, it is not unexpected that the
courts should be reluctant to accept the taxpayers' contention of a post-
construction "view to sell." Also, that such contentions are usually
supported primarily by the self-serving testimony of the taxpayer un-
doubtedly has been a factor in the courts' skepticism. In light of this
judicial attitude, it is somewhat surprising that the petitioners prevailed
in Jacobson, particularly when there were facts from which it reasonably
could be concluded that the "view to sell" was not prompted by the
discovery of a crack in one of the buildings."0
It is inevitable that attempts to interpret and apply a subjective
standard found in an ambiguous statute will be characterized by dis-
agreement and confusion. Perhaps the most feasible solution to the
problems involved in determining whether a corporation is collapsible
would be to abolish the subjective test. The Advisory Group appointed
in 1956 to assist the House Ways and Means Committee in its study of
subchapter C of the 1954 Code substituted an objective, and mathe-
matical test of collapsibility for the present subjective test.17 A corpora-
tion would be "collapsible" if the unrealized appreciation of non-capital
assets were "more than fifteen percent of the amount by which the fair
market value of all its assets exceeds all its liabilities, and more than
sale of stock was made only after the housing project proved to be a disappointing
financial failure. Raymond G. Burge, 28 T.C. 246 (1957). But see Coates v. United
States, P-H 196o Fed. Tax. Serv. (6 Am. Fed. Tax. R.zd 5200) 6o-5o65 (D.C. Ore.
May 17, 196o), in which the jury found that three corporations engaged in building
apartment houses were not collapsible corporations.
" On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Commissioner contended that the build-
ing defect was minor and did not motivate the sale, pointing out that: (x) a crack was
discovered in only one out of the five buildingsi (z) the crack extended to only
about three or four bricks; (3) the salesman who was employed by the petitioners to
sell the buildings and who was familiar with the buildings had previously testified
'that he did not learn of the crack until the time of the Tax Court hearing, (4) there
was no evidence that the mortgagee of the F.H.A. who insured the mortgage was in-
'formed of the discovery of the crack, although in the commitment for insurance there
was a requirement that any change in the condition of the buildings upon which the
insurance was given had to be reported to the F.H.A.; (5) the building was still
standing in January, 1959, approximately eight and one-half years after the discovery of
the crack; and (6) even though there was an investment of $t,Soo,ooo in the buildings,
petitioners made no thorough investigation of the seriousness of the crack.
The Advisory Group's proposals appear in section 343 of H.R. REP. No. 4459,
86th Cong., ist Sess. 43-52 (1959). For an excellent discussion of the Advisory
Group's recommendations, see Note, Collapsible Corporations: An Analyss of the
Past, Present, and Proposed Collapsible Concepts, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 855 (596o).
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fifteen percent of the unrealized appreciation on all its assets."' 8 Under
this test the motive of the taxpayer in forming the corporation would
be of no importance in determining whether the corporation is col-
lapsible. Removal of the uncertainty and confusion embodied in the
subjective phrase "with a view to" seems of sufficient worth to more
than balance any injustice that might occasionally result from the adop-
tion of an arbitrary objective standard. 9
"H.R. REP. No. 4459, 86th Cong., ist Sess. 51 0959). An objective standard
has been advocated by many legal writers. See, e.g., MacLean, Collapsible Corporations
-The Statute and Regulations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 55 (1953).
" The proposed objective test, however, also would raise new problems, for example,
the difficulty in valuing corporate assets. See Note, Collapsible Corporations: 4n
Analysis of the Past, Present, and Proposed Collapsible Concepts, supra note 17, at 884.
